



NOTTINGHAMSHIRE
Fire & Rescue Service
Creating Safer Communities

Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham
Fire and Rescue Authority
Finance and Resources Committee

OCCUPATIONAL ROAD RISK

Report of the Chief Fire Officer

Date: 10 October 2014

Purpose of Report:

To provide Members with an overview of the Authority's motor insurance accident history.

CONTACT OFFICER

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1. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 Members of the Finance and Resources Committee had previously requested that a report be brought to the 11 July 2014 meeting to provide an overview of the work being undertaken to manage the risk to the Authority posed by at-work driving activity. The report tabled described a number of complimentary measures that had been agreed by Corporate Management Board, and is attached at appendix A for reference.
- 1.2 Following receipt of the initial report, Members of the Finance and Resources Committee requested that they receive a further report on the Authority's motor insurance accident history and including a comparison of the Authority's approach to driver training with that of other Fire and Rescue Authorities.
- 1.3 The statistical analysis referred to in this report (attached at appendix B) has been presented to Corporate Management Board in order to provide a context for recommendations to change the Authority's driver training regime.

2. REPORT

- 2.1 The Service's Evaluation Officer collated accident data covering a period of seven years from 2007/08 to 2013/14. This dataset was compiled from T3 accident reports submitted to the Transport Department. This data was then analysed by the Business Risk Manager to produce the results and commentary attached at appendix B.
- 2.2 As part of the fleet and driver review undertaken by the Service's insurer, the insurer's representative spent a day with Service Driving School, which included a discussion around the quality of the training on offer. This identified that the range and quality of the training was not deficient in any respect, save the suggestion that some minor additional elements around the higher level of the Goals for Driver Education matrix, which encourage a coaching approach to training and self-reflection on the part of the driver, could be introduced. No issues were found with the technical and hazard perception elements of the driver training.
- 2.3 The attached analysis and commentary shows that the most frequently occurring accidents both under blue-light and normal driving conditions involve manoeuvring; whether reversing, negotiating tight gaps or undertaking vehicle movements in and around the station. Where large-scale losses have occurred, the principal causative factor has been inappropriate use of speed. Although the statistics show a reduction in both the overall number of accidents and also blue-light accidents, these reductions correlate with a decrease in the number of mobilisations and therefore the rate of accidents occurring has not improved. It is of concern that there has been an increase in accidents under normal driving conditions, with these now outnumbering blue-light accidents, and that more than three-quarters of these

are the fault of the Authority's driver. This is despite the widely-held belief that operational drivers are better trained and more skilful than the average driver.

- 2.4 The current EFAD training regime employed within the Authority is an initial 2-week course, followed by an assessment of around 2 hours approximately every two years. For the purposes of comparison, Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service (who are held to have a very successful record in managing their road risk) currently refresh their EFAD training over a 2-day period every five years. Derbyshire Fire and Rescue (who have had two high-profile vehicle accidents recently) are in the process of moving from their current arrangements of 1-hour every two years for wholetime, and 1-hour annually for retained drivers to a 2-day refresher every three years. Kent Fire and Rescue undertake a 1-day refresher every three years, while Hampshire, by contrast, have a 4-hour refresher every three years.
- 2.5 While it is pleasing to note that the Authority's accident history has not worsened over the period analysed, it is frustrating that there has not been improvement. Insurance premiums continue to rise and it will be impossible to manage these downwards without significantly improving the accident history. What is clear is that there needs to be a general rise in driving standards and attitudes towards driving, which should result in a decrease in both normal and blue-light driving accidents. The Area Manager, Service Delivery and the Business Risk Manager are currently investigating how driver training can be used to facilitate this improvement, and acknowledging that driver training is just one aspect of managing the Authority's at-work driving risk, Members are asked to note the contribution made by the complementary measures described in the previous report to delivering this outcome.

3. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

If it is felt necessary to alter the format of the EFAD refresher training, or to provide additional, targeted training for drivers, there may be financial implications in respect of the cost of releasing drivers for the additional training, unless there is sufficient resilience available. An improvement in the risk profile and claims experience of the Authority has the potential to deliver consistent savings against the current motor insurance premium of £265k, and a commensurate reduction in the cost of uninsured losses, principally those retained through the insurance policy deductible.

4. HUMAN RESOURCES AND LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

Learning and Development will be involved in a significant portion of the proposals being considered. While some of the work may be containable within existing resources, if there is a need to significantly alter the format of the EFAD refresher training, this may have an impact on the workload of Service Driving School and Service Delivery due to the need to commit additional person hours.

5. EQUALITIES IMPLICATIONS

An initial equality impact assessment has been completed and there are no equality implications arising directly from this report.

6. CRIME AND DISORDER IMPLICATIONS

There are no crime and disorder implications arising from this report.

7. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The measures outlined in this report reduce the risk of the Service being exposed to civil and/or criminal litigation resulting from at-work motor accidents.

8. RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

The risk arising from the use of vehicle on Authority business is one of the two highest risks on the corporate risk register. The insurers' review has been a significant initial control measure that has allowed for areas of improvement to be identified. Implementation of the recommendations made in the review will help to lower the level of risk to which the authority is exposed. The attention afforded to road risk management by both CMB and Elected Members is also demonstrable of the Authority's risk management process being effectively employed.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that Members:

- 9.1 Note that while the Authority's accident history has not worsened in recent years, it has failed to improve
- 9.2 Note the range of complementary measures being put in place to address the Authority's exposure to the risk of at-work driving

10. BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR INSPECTION (OTHER THAN PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS)

None.

John Buckley
CHIEF FIRE OFFICER



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Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham
Fire and Rescue Authority
Finance and Resources Committee

OCCUPATIONAL ROAD RISK

Report of the Chief Fire Officer

Date: 11 July 2014

Purpose of Report:

To advise Members of the work being undertaken to address the risks associated with at-work driving.

CONTACT OFFICER

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1. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 Members of the Finance and Resources Committee requested at the 4 April 2014 meeting that they receive a report on the work being undertaken by the Authority's Road Risk Group.
- 1.2 The Road Risk Group has been convened with varying degrees of regularity over at least ten years. Chairmanship of the group now sits with the Business Risk Manager, who has been tasked by the Director of Finance and Resources with addressing the 'Use of Vehicle on Authority Business' risk on the Corporate Risk Register.
- 1.3 Due to increasing motor insurance costs (both insured and uninsured) and a number of large claims in close proximity to one another, the Business Risk Manager used an insurance tender exercise in 2013 to seek assistance with the management of the Authority's road risk. The successful insurer proposed an independent 'fleet and driver' review and provided a small number of 'risk management days' to help implement the recommendations. The work of the Road Risk Group has been shaped by this independent review.

2. REPORT

- 2.1 Following the independent fleet and driver review, and a visit by the insurers' representative to Service Driving School, the Business Risk Manager prepared a report for Corporate Management Board (CMB), which was considered at their meeting on 19 May 2014. The outcomes of that debate are summarised below:
- 2.2 CMB requested a statistical analysis of accidents in order to establish if and where any changes to the current driver training regime are required. The Business Risk Manager is undertaking this work in conjunction with the Evaluations Officer and will report back to a future CMB meeting.
- 2.3 A business case is to be presented to CMB in respect of the delivery of an on-line presentation by a barrister and part-time judge covering the topic area of emergency services driver's responsibilities. This follows a viewing of the presentation by the Business Risk Manager, Transport Manager and Deputy Transport Manager at a recent Alarm road risk management seminar. The aim of this presentation will be to reinforce a positive organisational culture towards operational driving.
- 2.4 CMB agreed to the development and delivery of a 'Driver and Driving Management' course. The lack of any formal training of this nature for junior and middle managers became apparent during discussions with the insurers' representative. The Business Risk Manager and Training Delivery Manager have had positive discussions on the likely format of such training and advice will be sought from the insurers' representative, driver trainers, service

delivery and the transport department to determine the content of the courses.

- 2.5 Questions were raised in the insurers' representative's review about the robustness of the Service's motor accident investigation. Differing opinions as to the accuracy of this finding were expressed at CMB and the Road Risk Group has been tasked with reviewing the current motor accident investigation arrangements.
- 2.6 An aspect of road risk management that the Service could address immediately is the provision of general driving information covering all types of driving activity (operational, non-operational and private) to all employees, in order to refresh driving knowledge and ensure that any driving activity remains safe and legal. In order to communicate this type of information effectively, CMB gave the go-ahead for a driving 'micro-site' as part of the Service's intranet. The Business Risk Manager will meet with the Head of Corporate Communications and Admin to discuss how this can be delivered, and various stakeholders concerning the content to be delivered.
- 2.7 Overall, the insurer's review has demonstrated that there is no one single significant deficiency in the Service's current approach to work-related driving. Rather, there are a number of small changes that can cumulatively deliver a significant improvement in the risk profile of the Service and, ultimately, a reduction in insured and uninsured losses. The key changes are those covered in paragraphs 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6, which all seek to improve both the organisational culture, and individual attitudes towards driving activity.
- 2.8 The Business Risk Manager is seeking to implement these measures within the next six to nine months in order that they, and their effect, can be reported in the next invitation to tender for motor insurance, which will be written around August 2015 and sent out to the market for an April 2016 renewal.

3. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Some of the recommendations and work streams emanating from the insurers' report will require modest expenditure. However, it is felt that this expenditure can be largely contained within existing budgets. The exception to this may arise if it is felt necessary to alter the format of the EFAD refresher training. An improvement in the risk profile and claims experience of the Authority has the potential to deliver consistent insurance premium savings and a reduction in the cost of uninsured losses.

4. HUMAN RESOURCES AND LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

Learning and Development will be involved in a significant portion of the work outlined above. While most of the work will be containable within existing budgets, if there is a need to significantly alter the format of the EFAD refresher training, this

may have an impact on the workload of Service Driving School and Service Delivery due to the need to commit additional person hours.

5. EQUALITIES IMPLICATIONS

An initial equality impact assessment has been completed and there are no equality implications arising directly from this report.

6. CRIME AND DISORDER IMPLICATIONS

There are no crime and disorder implications arising from this report.

7. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The measures outlined in this report reduce the risk of the Service being exposed to civil and/or criminal litigation resulting from at-work motor accidents.

8. RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

The risk arising from the use of vehicle on Authority business is one of the two highest risks on the corporate risk register. The insurers' review has been a significant initial control measure that has allowed for areas of improvement to be identified. Implementation of the recommendations made in the review will help to lower the level of risk to which the authority is exposed. The attention afforded to road risk management by both CMB and Elected Members is also demonstrable of the Authority's risk management process being effectively employed.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

That Members note the measures being taken to reduce the Authority's exposure to the risks associated with at-work driving


10. BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR INSPECTION (OTHER THAN PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS)

None.

John Buckley
CHIEF FIRE OFFICER


Statistical analysis of motor accident data

Overall picture of accidents 1st April 2007 to 31st March 2014




The overall picture of the Service’s accident record is that there has been a decrease in the total number of accidents over the last seven years of 20%. This is primarily due to a decrease in blue-light incidents of 40% over that period, but there has also been an increase in accidents under normal road conditions of 35% over the period. There are a number of ‘unknown’ journey types (i.e. it is not clear whether the accident occurred while on blue-lights), and a further nine accidents have not been considered above as their reports did not contain a date. This raises questions around data quality and it is recommended that CMB task the road risk group with monitoring and reporting on data quality. Measures to address the quality of data recording will be included in the mandatory ‘driver and driving management’ training that CMB agreed to support in the last paper.

Although the total number of accidents under blue-light conditions is showing a steady decline, this is not to say that our standards of driving have been improved. When taking in to account the number of mobilisations (which have also been falling), the rate at which we have been having accidents has remained fairly constant at 0.107%-0.14% (i.e. a range of 1 accident for every 710 (highest frequency, 2008/09) to 934 (lowest frequency, 2009/10) mobilisations).




Blue-light accidents as a percentage of mobilisations

Concern has been expressed from within the Service that a falling number of incident calls has resulted in a situation where blue-light drivers are at a higher risk of having an accident due to skills fade resulting from a lack of opportunity to drive. However, the data does not bear this out – there has not been a spike or even a gradual and consistent increase in the rate of blue-light accidents. What we have seen though, is that in addition to the frequency of blue-light accidents remaining relatively constant, there is a worrying trend of an increasing proportion of blue-light accidents being the fault of the Service driver. This dispels some suggestions from within the Service and from other emergency services that there is a need to educate other road users in how to react to the presence of an emergency vehicle on blue-lights.



2007-2014

- Blue light driving, 90% of accidents were own fault
- Normal road conditions, 79% of accidents were own fault
- At fault incidents were split 50% between blue light and normal driving




2011-2014

- Blue light driving, 93.5% of accidents were own fault
- Normal road conditions, 75.5% of accidents were own fault
- At fault incidents were split 44% blue light and 56% normal driving


The falling proportion of own-fault accidents under normal road use, coupled with an increasing number of normal road use accidents is indicative of a general decline in driving standards. However, the fact that Service drivers are still at fault for three-quarters of the accidents occurring under normal road use means that we cannot simply point the finger at the general public.

Accident profile

The profile of accidents shows that for both normal road use, and blue light driving, the majority of accidents occur while manoeuvring.




2007-2014




2011-2014

Manoeuvring includes movement around the station (e.g. hitting appliance room doors), reversing, negotiating narrow access and grounding of the vehicle. Manoeuvring is an issue for both blue-light driving and normal road use. These types of accident are indicative of a lack of spatial awareness, observation or mirror use on the part of the driver, and/or failure by the driver, OIC and crew to utilise signallers or some other form of look-out. The most common form of manoeuvring accident is reversing and further analysis has been carried out on that in order to gain a better understanding of the issues.



2007-2014



2011-2014

Surprisingly, over the seven year period, we have seen three times as many reversing accidents taking place with a signaller than without. The picture over the last three years shows that this trend is worsening. There are three possible explanations for this:

1. That drivers have a lack of spatial awareness, and awareness of the size of their own vehicle;
2. That the competence of signallers and/or the current signalling system are poor; or
3. That accident forms are being filled in to show that signallers were being used when in fact they were not.

The Service Evaluations Officer had already reported to the Road Risk Group on the analysis of accident statistics for the period 01/04/07-31/03/13. As part of that report, there was an analysis of the impact of potential additional risk factors such as weather, the road condition and the road layout. What the analysis showed was that additional risk factors had a limited impact on accidents. Key messages from that analysis were:

- 73% of accidents occurred when weather conditions were clear, only 11% of accidents occurred when it was raining
- 70% of accidents occurred on dry road surfaces, 22% occurred when road surfaces were wet
- 50% of accidents occurred on two-way streets
- 35% of accidents occurred on a straight road (note: 22% of accidents were classified as 'other' road configurations, despite 12 other options being available, again highlighting the issue of data quality)
- 70% of accidents occurred on a level surface

Analysis of large-scale incidents:

While the picture for most of the accidents is one of problems associated with manoeuvring and particularly reversing, it is also appropriate to consider the large-scale accidents that the Service has been involved in.

- Tuxford, 2007 – appliance rolled after a series of over steer slides while responding to an emergency call. Excessive speed for the prevailing road conditions (wet) compounded by a failure to react properly to a hazardous situation – poor decision-making.
- Ashfield 2009 – appliance skidded on slippery road surface and crashed sideways in to a wall while responding to an emergency call. Excessive speed for the prevailing road conditions – although the OIC, crew and investigating officer all believed that the speed was reasonable, despite all identifying the slippery nature of the road conditions.
- Central 2009 – appliance turned right across the path of an overtaking motorcyclist without indicating while traveling to revisit an incident scene. Poor use of mirrors and indicators by driver.
- Stockhill, 2011 – appliance crashed into a parade of shops while responding to an emergency call. Excessive speed for the prevailing road conditions, although the OIC did believe that the speed was reasonable. CCTV footage showed that prior to the actual accident, the driver failed to respond appropriately to a number of hazards.

All three of the accidents that occurred under blue-light conditions were caused by inappropriate speed on wet or slippery road surfaces. In all three cases, the appliances failed to attend the incident to which they were mobilised and were unavailable for significant periods of time while they were being repaired. All three of the blue-light incidents had the potential to seriously injure or kill members of the crew or public, while the accident under blue-light conditions did result in serious injury to the motorcyclist. All four accidents were the fault of the Service drivers.